Of Fire and Brimstone: A study on German memory of the air raids from the Second World War

On October 22, 2003, the British ambassador to Germany, Sir Peter Torry, visited the city of Kassel.¹ The purpose of his arrival in the German community was to attend the sixtieth anniversary of the bombing of Kassel by British warplanes on 22 October 1943, where 10,000 people were killed by a firestorm that was created from the bombings.² In his address at the ceremony, Sir Peter’s speech spoke before a public who have had a different experience from that of the British. Where Britain remembers the Second World War as a time of hiding in shelters from air raids by the German Luftwaffe, Winston Churchill’s war speeches, and posters calling on their people to keep calm and carry on; Germany recalls a time of oppression under Adolf Hitler and chaos from the bombings by the Allies. Germany’s conception of its time in the Second World War has also been shaped from its time in the Cold War as the Federal Republic of Germany in the west and the German Democratic Republic in the east. In studying the German recollection of the bombings of German cities by Britain and the United States, it can be seen that Germany has a complex memory of the Second World War.

Thunderclap

The bombing of German cities such as Dresden and Hamburg have a part in the memory of the war for Germany. The British had considered launching air raids on the German capital of Berlin in July 1944 under the codename “Thunderclap” with the intention of using large scale casualties to break morale among the German public, particularly in the city of Berlin.³ According to historian Bill Niven, the choice to bomb other German cities were “a prelude to the development of plans for Operation ‘Thunderclap’,”⁴ meaning that the air raids conducted by British planes over Germany served as a practice that could also help in affecting the determination of the German people and cause them to put pressure upon their leaders. Niven also points out that the plan of attack was not solely a British plan, citing that discussions on targeting German cities had been conducted by Britain, the United States and Russia during the Yalta Conference in early February 1945.⁵

Hamburg after a bombing

The city of Hamburg had seen several air attacks before the Allies had begun plans for “Thunderclap”. Between 1940 and 1941, the city was the site of one hundred twelve attacks with seven hundred fifty one casualties as a result.⁶ A second series of sixty-five raids between 1944 and 1945 killed five thousand six hundred ninety residents.⁷ Though these two periods of air raids were horrific to the people of Hamburg, the summer bombings of 1943 are considered to be the most devastating with forty thousand deaths in July of 1943 alone.⁸ In most cases, citizens died not in the streets but from hiding in shelters and cellars as a way to protect themselves from the bombs.⁹ As the attacks would go on, cellars would start “absorbing the external heat… or they [would] imperceptibly filled with combustion gases,” making gas poisoning contribute seventy to eighty percent of all causes of death in the air raids during the summer of 1943.¹⁰ The air raids also caused firestorms that first ravaged Hamburg’s working-class districts of Hammerbrook, Hamm, and Borgfeld.¹¹ The city center of Hamburg survived the raids for the most part until July 18, 1944, where eight hundred Americans heading to the Blohm and Voss shipyards miscalculated their targets and resulted in their bombs landing in areas such as Gänsemarkt Square.¹²

In February 1945, Dresden boasted approximately eight hundred thousand to a million people; of this number roughly six hundred forty thousand were permanent residents while the remainder were refugees.¹³ In the air raids that occurred on February 13 and 14, 1945, forty thousand people were killed.¹⁴ The raids also created firestorms within half an hour after ally planes had departed from the city, killing an estimated seventy thousand people.¹⁵ As mentioned before, the point of these attacks

Dresden after a bombing

was to weaken the morale of the German people in order to force Germany into surrendering. The bombings by the allies resulted in around six hundred thousand deaths and 3.37 million homes destroyed.¹⁶ The Nazi Party even expected this result from the attacks.¹⁷ In a meeting with Adolf Hitler on August 1, 1944, Field Marshal Erhard Milch, inspector general of the Luftwaffe, stated: “We have lost the war! Finally lost the war!”¹⁸ It is clear from this that even before the attack on Dresden, the German military was beginning to see their demise.

Remembering the war - F.R.G.

The memory of the Second World War for German was shaped during its time of separation as West and East Germany. The memory of the war by both sides was influenced by the Cold War, which pushed both states into a “bitter competition over which state had learned the appropriate lessons from history.”¹⁹ First, the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) had a certain framework in remembering the events of the war. On the whole, West Germany viewed the Nazi regime that dominated the formally united Germany during the Second World War as strictly totalitarian and believed that its eastern counterpart was trapped in a totalitarian government under the Soviet Union.²⁰ In this anti-totalitarian framework, the F.R.G. “played down the specifically German nature of Nazism” and instead emphasised the fact that Germans had suffered under Hitler’s Nazi regime and drew parallels to that of the Jews in the Holocaust.²¹ The anti-communist sentiment in the west led the F.R.G. to focus on the suffering of Germans by Communist soldiers near the end of the war.²² The images of the “killings, rape and pilfering carried out by soldiers of the Red Army” served as a warning of the dangers of Communism in East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe.²³

With regards to the bombings, West Germans took on an image of being “double victims.”²⁴ As they were under the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party, Germans were forced into the war. The air raids by the British and United States over German cities made Germans victims in another dimension by showing them as innocents in a war against their dictator. This image of double victimhood was enhanced through works of memory literature by historians like Malte Thieβen, which went on to shape the memorial culture of the bombings in German cities such as Hamburg.²⁵

The German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) created a different post-war legacy. In this situation, the east took a stanch anti-fascist view to Nazism.²⁶ The Communist Party (S.E.D.) followed their western counterparts and removed the German context from its understanding Nazism but they also placed it as a “class-based phenomenon, minimalizing its nationalist and racial dimensions.”²⁷ The S.E.D. also concentrated their vision of the Second World War to be about the “glorious struggle of the Soviet Union and German Communists” against Hitler and Nazism.²⁸ This meant that the treatment of Germans by Red Army soldiers went without criticism or question.²⁹

Remembering the War - GDR

The G.D.R. government aimed to play on the image of the bombing of German cities to strengthen their view of the war and the anti-Western rhetoric of the Soviet Union, which can be seen in their approach to the memory of the bombing of Dresden. In this image, the Germans of Dresden were cast as the sufferers of “British-American aggression.”³⁰ Since the fifth anniversary of the bombings in 1950, the S.E.D. used the event to twist it into an incident caused by “Anglo-American warmongers,”³¹ while the Soviets were seen as liberators rather than rapists and plunderers like in the west.³² This imagery of the Dresden was reinforced through yearly ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the bombings and through “corresponding interpretations in official school text books.”³³ Speeches presented at these ceremonies were used to strengthen the anti-western sentiment in East Germany with updated statements to match what was seen as the latest “Western – particularly American and West German – threat to world peace.”³⁴ In 1952, the G.R.D.’s German Peace Committee (Deutsches Friedenskomitee) designed a tribute to the city by making it appear as the symbol of the “will to rebuild” and served as an example during the rebuilding of East Berlin.³⁵ The German Peace Committee argued that the resolve to revitalize Germany was under threat by the west and Germans, especially those in the east, were “in danger of becoming victims again.”³⁶ The overall view of the bombings in Dresden was clear: Germany were victims both fascism and western imperialism during the war. The Soviets came to save Germany from this violent behaviour and have allowed East Germany the chance to rebuild itself despite the threat of the west. Throughout the fifties, the S.E.D. tried to spread this concept to West Germany, hoping that the latter would support the “idea of peaceful German unification under socialist auspices.”³⁷

Revising Memories - Post-unification

Since reunification, Germany has had to come to terms with several parts of its past, this ranging from understanding not only the victims of Nazism but also those involved in supporting the Nazi regime in Germany.³⁸ It has made both the Eastern and Western halves of Germany come to realize that both communism and Nazism were “but variants of totalitarian barbarity.”³⁹ This development discredited G.D.R.’s anti-fascist understanding of the war and strengthened the F.R.G.’s anti-totalitarian framework.⁴⁰ An example of this change in perception can be seen in the G.D.R.’s memorial dedication against fascism – “To the victims of fascism and militarism” – was replaced to read: “To the victims of war and the rule of violence.”⁴¹ In this example, the original phrase only sees Germans being only being the victims of fascism but the change in phrasing changes this frame of mind by broadening what the Germans were victims of , in the west’s view, totalitarianism and not fascism.

Echos of the Past

People walking through the ruins of the city of Peja, Kosovo.
Pictures like this bought back memories of Allied bombings
in Germany.

Since the reunification, the memory of the bombings became less a part of German memory of the Second World War.⁴² However, participation in N.A.T.O. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) conflicts such as the Kosovo conflict in 1999 have caused the public to reopen the debate on civilian bombings.⁴³ The Kosovo crisis spoke volumes for Germans as televisions showed images of “dishevelled refugees and victims of ethnic cleansing arriving en masse [to] Albania” brought back memories of the Holocaust and the Second World War.⁴⁴ The 2003 Iraq conflict also reminded Germans of civilian bombings with images of the massive damage to cities and towns in Afghanistan and Iraq ushering back the memory of the attacks that occurred in cities like Dresden and Hamburg.⁴⁵ German youth, some even in elementary school, united together under the phrase “We know what it’s like to be bombed.”⁴⁶ To the German public, the bombing of Iraqi cities like Baghdad was the same as the bombings of German cities. This attitude toward Baghdad could be traced back to the eastern view of Germans being victims of western aggression. To Germany, the 2003 conflict could have easily have been viewed as another example of this aggression by the United States just as the bombings on German cities was a form of western hostility.

Conclusions

In closing, the memory of the allied bombings of German cities during the Second World War has changed in the second half of the twentieth century. During the Cold War period, the F.R.G. and the G.D.R.’s understanding of German victimhood during Second World War, and particularly the bombings, were shaped by their situations. The F.R.G.’s experience as a democratic state made it view the war as a product of totalitarianism and that Germans were both victims of the allies and of Hitler’s regime; while the G.D.R. saw the bombings as further evidence of the dangers of Western imperialism and that Germans were victims of this aggression during the war. Though the F.R.G.’s anti-totalitarian approach won out after reunification, the G.D.R.’s elements of the west as a threat still shine through in German society as seen in the German reaction to the Iraq conflict in 2003. Therefore, as Germany continues to come to terms with its past, its view of the victimhood of its people will continuously change and will be shaped by the current events that occur in world affairs.

Bibliography

Beattie, Andrew H. “The Victims of Totalitarianism and the Centrality of Nazi Genocide: Continuity and the Change in German Commemorative Politics”. In Germans as Victims, edited by Bill Niven, 147-163. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Berger, Stefan. “On Taboos, Traumas and Other Myths: Why the Debate about German Victims of the Second World War is not a Historians’ Controversy”. In Germans as Victims, edited by Bill Niven, 210-224. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Di Scala, Spencer M. Europe’s Long History: Society Politics, and Culture, 1900-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Friedrich, Jörg. The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945. Translated by Allison Brown. New York: Columba University Press, 2006.

Harding, Luke. “Germany's forgotten victims”. The Guardian, October 22, 2003. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/22/worlddispatch.germany.

Huyssen, Andreas. “Air War Legacies: From Dresden to Bagdad”. In Germans as Victims, edited by Bill Niven, 181-193. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Kitchen, Mark. A History of Modern Germany: 1800 to the Present. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.

Niven, Bill. “GDR and Memory of the Bombing of Dresden”. In Germans as Victims, edited by Bill Niven, 109-129. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Notes:

1 Luke Harding, “Germany's forgotten victims”, The Guardian, October 22, 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/22/worlddispatch.germany.

2 Ibid.

3 Bill Niven, “GDR and Memory of the Bombing of Dresden”, in Germans as Victims, edited by Bill Niven, 109-129, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 110.

4 Ibid.

5 Niven, “The GDR and the Memory of the bombing of Dresden”, 111.

6 Jörg Friedrich, The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945, translated by Allison Brown, (New York: Columba University Press, 2006), 165.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 166.

9 Ibid., 167.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Friedrich, 167.

13 Ibid., 310.

14 Ibid.

15 Jörg Friedrich, The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945, translated by Allison Brown, (New York: Columba University Press, 2006), 313; Spencer M. Di Scala, Europe’s Long History: Society Politics, and Culture, 1900-1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 446.

16 Mark Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany: 1800 to the Present, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 299.

17 Friedrich, 98.

18 Ibid.

19 Andrew H. Beattie, “The Victims of Totalitarianism and the Centrality of Nazi Genocide: Continuity and the Change in German Commemorative Politics”, in Germans as Victims, edited by Bill Niven, 147-163, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 151.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 152.

22 Stefan Berger, “On Taboos, Traumas and Other Myths: Why the Debate about German Victims of the Second World War is not a Historians’ Controversy”, in Germans as Victims, edited by Bill Niven, 210-224, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 213.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Berger, 213.

26 Beattie, 151.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Berger, 215.

30 Niven, “The GDR and the Memory of the bombing of Dresden”, 114.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 115.

33 Niven, “The GDR and the Memory of the bombing of Dresden”, 115.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., 115-116.

37 Ibid., 116.

38 Beattie, 155.

39 Ibid.

40 Beattie, 155.

41 Ibid.

42 Andreas Huyssen, “Air War Legacies: From Dresden to Bagdad”, in Germans as Victims, edited by Bill Niven, 181-193, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 183.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

Can London Keep Calm and Carry On? A Look at Morale Boosting and the Battle of London

             The London Blitz is an event from the Second World War that has always been remembered as a time of unity. It is often remembered as a time when London and other cities across Britain were bombarded by the German air force, known as the Luftwaffe. In the city of London, writes Richard F. Snow, one can still see the reminders of the Blitz on “the drab new buildings around St. Paul’s Cathedral,”¹ which is seen as a symbol of Britain’s “simple refusal to dissolve under the Luftwaffe’s hammering.”² Though it is seen as a time where Britons joined together and held out while their homes were destroyed, there was a need to keep morale up during the Blitz in order to prevent Britain from being put into a place where they would have to surrender to Nazi Germany. The methods of morale boosting came from the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and those who were helping to maintain order in London during the air raids. The use of the morale boosting tactics served to not only to keep order in the capital of the British Empire, but also as an example of British determination to the world stage.
Total War Par Excellence

          The origins of the Blitz can be traced back to August 24, 1940 during the Battle of Britain, when two German bombers, without orders from control, dropped bombs on the city of London.³ The Royal Air Force (RAF) responded with an air strike on the German capital of Berlin, which prompted Adolf Hitler to declare that “London would be subjected to the full wrath of the German Luftwaffe.”⁴ On September 4 of that year, annoyed from the continued attack on German cities, Hitler announced that the Luftwaffe would destroy the British capital of London and the German air force to shift its concentration from RAF Fighter Command Bases and Communications.⁵ On September 5, the Luftwaffe had an introductory raid sent to London but Reichsmarshall Herman Göring gave the official order for raids to commence on September 7.⁶ On that day, close to one thousand Luftwaffe bombers were sent across the English Channel on route to the London.⁷ The attack marked the beginning of the Blitz; a period that would last from September 1940 to May 1941 with London facing “fifty-seven consecutive days at the start of the onslaught.”⁸

           In his book Britain and 1940: The History, Myth and Popular Memory, Malcolm Smith notes that the bombings were indiscriminate in who were killed. Over the course of the Blitz, over forty thousand civilians were killed, exceeding that of British uniformed casualties until late 1942.⁹ For those who lived through the Second World War, an aerial attack was “total war par excellence” and an air war would mean “there will be collateral damage, that hospitals will be bombed and children killed.”¹⁰ To the British public, the collateral damage was seen as a deliberate act rather than rather than as an “unavoidable side-effect.”¹¹

A War of Words

Winston Churchill
British Prime Minister 1940-1945

            One of the ways the British Government attempted to keep morale up during the Blitz, and throughout the war, were the speeches of their Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Churchill was an interesting figure. Seen by his own party, the Conservatives, and the Opposition as untrustworthy for “being a turncoat, an extremist, as a politician more fond of rhetoric and dreams than practicalities.”¹² For this reason one can see there was little support for Churchill in Parliament after the formation of the coalition government on 10 May 1940.¹³

            From a technical stand point, Churchill’s speeches use rhetoric to shape the view of the threat of German invasion. In his article “Words as weapons for mass persuasion: dysphemism in Churchill's wartime speeches”, Eliecer Crespo-Fernández presents the how Churchill uses words to structure the image of Nazi Germany by “expressing negative evaluation of behaviours through emotionally loaded and intense language.”¹⁴ One example of this can be seen in an earlier speech before the Battle of Britain known as “Fight them on the Beaches”. In this speech, Churchill uses imagery to portray the Nazi Germans as animals.

… [T]he Navy, using nearly [one thousand] ships of all kinds, carried over [three hundred thirty-five thousand] men, French and English from the jaws of death and shame, to their native land and to the tasks which lie immediately ahead.¹⁵

In this excerpt, Churchill is describing the Germans as the animalistic jaws of death to bring to mind “images of human tragedy.”¹⁶ Crespo-Fernández notes that the use of this portrayal of humans as animals is meant to “deny their humanity,”¹⁷ this in turn “reinforces the intentional force of the insult and ultimately justifies their elimination.”¹⁸ Churchill, drawing influence from the Nazi Germans, who used this same kind of animal imagery to portray the Jews as “parasites that threaten the body of the German nation” and therefore had to be removed.¹⁹ In this case, Churchill is using the animal imagery to unite the British populous under the idea that the Germans themselves are animals and inhuman for their attacks on British and French soldiers.

Adolf Hitler
Fuhrer of Germany 1934-1945

            Churchill used these speeches not only to unite British support against the Germans, but also to boost morale. This is used by elevating the British against the Germans through the use of descriptors to place the Germans in a negative light. The use of negative adjectives, writes Crespo-Fernández, is “appropriate for creating emphasis and attaching emotive value to the noun,”²⁰ which in turn makes Churchill’s use of such descriptors useful in emphasising the threat Nazi Germany was toward Britain. Evidence of this use can be seen in Churchill’s speech from 11 September 1940:

These cruel, wanton, indiscriminate bombings of London are, of course, a part of Hitler’s invasion plans. He hopes, by killing large numbers of civilians… that he will terrorize and cow the people of this mighty imperial city, and make them a burden and anxiety to the government and thus distract our attention unduly from the ferocious onslaught he is preparing.²¹

In this section of that speech, Churchill uses adjectives such as cruel, wanton and indiscriminate to shape the actions of the Germans against the city of London. He ends this section with the warning that the bombings are only part of a further attack that Hitler is planning. In using this description, Churchill can convince his audience that the Germans are not only a threat to the city of London, but also the empire.

In this same speech, Churchill uses positive descriptors to meet the same means Crespo-Fernández describes in the case of London. Following his description of Germany’s acts on London, Churchill writes:

…Little does [Hitler] know the spirit of the British nation, or the tough fibre of the Londoners, whose forebears played a leading part in the establishment of Parliament institutions and who have been bread to value freedom far above their lives.²²

In this case, Churchill uses positive descriptors to paint Britons as morally just. While before this excerpt, he portrays Hitler and Nazi Germany negatively, here Churchill argues that the Londoners and, to a greater extent, Britain will overcome the force of Nazism because of their determination and democratic heritage. Thus, by looking at the speeches of Winston Churchill, one can see how the British government used rhetoric to keep up public support during the time of the Blitz.

Londoners seeking shelter in the London Undergrounds
during an air raid.  A common sight during the Blitz.

In addition, the use of images of servicemen, such as the air raid warren and fire crews in the city of London, served as a way of keeping confidence up during the Blitz. Malcolm Smith points out that life in London during the Blitz was full of inconveniences. Because the city was too large a target to be “hit decisively by a medium bomber force,”²³ Londoners had to deal with situations where “railway termini were often out of service, buses had to follow a circuitous route to avoid demolished streets or unexploded bombs, and gas, electricity and telephone services failed frequently,”²⁴ all due to the constant bombings by the Luftwaffe. On top of all this, Londoners suffered from lack of sleep due to the frequent trips to the bomb shelters every night.25

An air raid warden coming to rescue after an air raid.

Though the public felt strained from all this, it was nothing compared the sleepless work done by the civil defense, air-raid wardens and firemen who would be “stretched to their limit and sometimes beyond throughout the Blitz.”²⁶ The air-raid wardens, writes Malcolm Smith, were seen at the beginning of the war as a “little Hitler” of sorts, always shouting to “put that light out!”²⁷ This image changed as the war progressed due because many of these wardens were locals who had extensive knowledge of their community, the people and its geography.²⁸
Fires Were Started

Auxiliary Firemen putting out a
fire on Oxford Street.

The most remembered of those who served within the city of London were the members of the Auxiliary Fire Service. Throughout the Blitz, fire storms erupted all over London due to the bombings, they even acted as a beacon for bombers during a second wave of attacks.²⁹ As these fires ravaged London, it was the Auxiliary Fire Service who worked to prevent further damage from causing further damage during the raids of September 7 and December 29, where they had to contend with up to one thousand five hundred separate fires.³⁰

The Auxiliary Fire Service found itself being used to both boost support within the empire and to gain support from the United States. Within Britain, the fire service found themselves the subject of a feature-length film by Humphrey Jennings 1942 film Fires Were Started. In this film, real firemen were used to play the characters as the audience is shown the working day of the Auxiliary Fire Service during 1940.³¹ What is unique about this film, when compared to other British propaganda films of its time, is that Fires Were Started does not feature any signs of the war such as bombings, the cursing of Nazis, nor does it emphasis the “the courage of the firemen in the face of great danger.”³² The reason this film is effective as propaganda, according to Malcolm Smith, is because by the time Fires Were Started was made “such notions had become established truths in the realm of common sense.”³³

The American Connection
The efforts of London’s fire brigade also found its way into the United States as a way to gain further support. On February 1, 1941, the Officer Commanding London Fire Services, Major F. W. Jackson DSO, sent word to the secretary of the War Artists Advisory Committee (WAAC), E. M. O’Rourke Dickey, that he had found a group of artists within his force with “a large amount of hidden talent.”³⁴ Jackson had hoped that the WAAC would be able to judge them and, if they were of sufficient quality, be sent to the United States.³⁵ After the proposal gained the support of the WAAC chairman, Kenneth Clark, Dickey made arrangements for J. B. Manson, former curator of the Tate Gallery, to inspect the art pieces.³⁶ Upon inspection, Dickey, who had accompanied Manson to see the paintings, concluded in a message sent to Clark that the artworks would be “worth sending to the United States for propaganda purposes.”³⁷

Auxiliary Firemen by Leonard Rosoman.

By March 10, 1941, preparations were made to show the “first public ‘firemen artist’ exhibition” in London at the Central School of Arts and Crafts, serving as a practice before sending the one hundred pieces of art to the United States.³⁸ It was titled The Great Fire of London, as a reference to the seventeenth century event as to promise “paintings of spectacular action and heroism.³⁹ The collection was met with as many as thirty thousand visitors and high praise from journalists, who had been told in advance of the intentions for the exhibition.⁴⁰ British newspapers, such as the Daily Telegraph, claimed that the United States was about to see “the most dramatic collection of pictures ever assembled: impressions of the Siege of London as set down by 20 auxiliary firemen and women auxiliaries.”⁴¹ When the exhibition was finally sent out for the United States, it was decided to send a group comprised of “one auxiliary artist, one injured auxiliary Blitz veteran and one senior regular fireman, who would be capable of answering technical queries.”⁴²

The strategy of the whole operation was to gain further support from the United States. By sending art work depicting the events of the Blitz on London and having firemen who had experienced working in those conditions first hand, the American public would then be moved to push their government to send more support to the British, and it was a success in gaining American support. At the end of 1942, over half a million Americans attended the exhibitions, with over six hundred thousand attending the lectures provided by the firemen.⁴³

In conclusion, through studying the forms of propaganda used to boost morale during the Blitz, one can see that it not only served to keep the support of the British people but also served to gain support from the United States. Churchill’s wartime speeches shaped the people to view Nazi Germany as the dangerous threat it was and to emphasis the determination of the British, particularly in London, to hold out during the war. The efforts of those serving as air-raid wardens and in London’s Fire Service were used as examples for the British people during the war, the latter even being used to gain further support in the United States. These images tactics proved to be successful in their mission and have played a part in shaping the memory of the Second World War. Therefore, the use of propaganda served a role in forming the united image that has shaped the popular memory of the Blitz.

Bibliography

Aceto, Guy. “Shadows of the Blitz in Today's London.” World War II 24, no. 5 (January 2010): 28-30. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 6, 2014).

Attar, Rob. “Where History Happened: The Blitz.” BBC History Magazine. October 12, 2009. http://www.historyextra.com/blitz.

Churchill, Winston. His Finest Hours: The War Speeches of Winston Churchill. Edited by Graham Stewart. London: Quercus, 2007.

Crespo-Fernández, Eliecer. “Words as weapons for mass persuasion: dysphemism in Churchill's wartime speeches.” Text & Talk33, no. 3 (May 2013): 311-330. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 23, 2014).

Kelly, Anthony. “Taking the Blitz to America.” History Today 62, no. 6 (June 2012): 21-27. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 6, 2014).

“More information about: Germany bombs London.” BBC History. Accessed February 23, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/germany_bombs_london.

Smith, Malcolm. Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory. London: Rouledge, 2000.

Snow, Richard F. “London calling.” American Heritage 42, no. 8 (December 1991): 31. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 23, 2014).

Notes

1 Richard F. Snow, "London calling," American Heritage 42, no. 8 (December 1991): 31, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

2 Ibid.

3 Guy Aceto, "Shadows of the Blitz in Today's London," World War II 24, no. 5 (January 2010): 28, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

4 Ibid.

5 “More information about: Germany bombs London,” BBC History, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/germany_bombs_london.

6 Ibid.

7 Rob Attar, “Where History Happened: The Blitz,” BBC History Magazine, http://www.historyextra.com/blitz.

8 Ibid.

9 Malcom Smith, Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory, (London: Rouledge, 2000), 70.

10 Ibid., 71.

11 Ibid.

12 Smith, 91.

13 Ibid.

14 Eliecer Crespo-Fernández, “Words as weapons for mass persuasion: dysphemism in Churchill's wartime speeches,” Text & Talk33, no. 3 (May 2013): 316, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

15 Winston Churchill, His Finest Hours: The War Speeches of Winston Churchill, edited by Graham Stewart, (London: Quercus, 2007), 50.

16 Crespo-Fernández, 319.

17 Ibid., 318.

18 Ibid.

19 Crespo-Fernández, 318.

20 Ibid., 325.

21 Churchill, 81.

22 Churchill, 81.

23 Smith, 77.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Smith, 77.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid, 78.

29 “More information about: Germany bombs London.”

30 Smith, 78.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 80.

33 Smith, 80.

34 Anthony Kelly, “Taking the Blitz to America,” History Today 62, no. 6 (June 2012): 22, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 23.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Kelly, 23.

43 Ibid., 27.